Supporting War Rationale
Rationale for war comes in many forms including self defense, honoring an alliance, or preemptive strike to name a few. The conventional wisdom from Vietnam is America will support an administration's rationale for war as long as it supports a vital US interest, but not indefinitely. President Johnson's rationale and his escalation of the Vietnam War might best be described by three incremental measures-the US Containment Policy, the Domino Theory, and the Congressional Tonkin Gulf Resolution.
During the Cold War, the US's dominate geo-political strategy was based on National Security Council Report 68, which advocated a policy of containment towards the Soviet Union to the free world in Southeast Asia but a drastic loss of confidence in the will and capacity of the free world to oppose aggression.‖ 5 But it was not just the administration and military who believed in the Domino Theory. raised revenue by about 1 percent of GDP. 26 By war's end the overall total military costs were $708 billion. 27 At its peak in 1968, defense spending accounted for 9 percent of GDP of which war costs equaled 2.3 percent of GDP.‖ 28, 29 By 1968, war expenditures rose by more than 50 percent. 30 Although this caused little economic disruption during the early 1960s, the surge in military purchases triggered inflationary pressures. In 1969, the consumer price index soared to 6 percent, making consumer borrowing more expensive (See Figure 1 for Annual Inflation Rates). 31 Johnson faced a dilemma-he needed the economy to continue growing to pay for the war and domestic programs, but he benefited from inflation as it pushed taxpayers into higher tax rates which in turn increased government revenues. Although Americans were not initially asked to sacrifice financially nor did they feel the effects from inflation or rising interest rates until the later 1960s, Johnson's policies could not be sustained. Americans were in fact asked to sacrifice via excise taxes, and paid indirect economic costs through inflation. Additionally, -by pretending that the war would be relatively inexpensive, Johnson also failed to prepare Americans for the additional tax burdens that eventually would come and heightened their distrust of the administration.‖ For the average US taxpayer, this reliance on foreign debt meant no taxes to finance the Afghanistan War. Indeed, due to the Bush tax cuts a family of four with an annual household income of $50,000 saved over $2,900 per year. 40 Yet, despite how the war was paid, the costs added up. According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan have cost close to $1 trillion thus far. 41 However, although direct and indirect economic costs are significant and climbing, the total dollars spent has not exceeded the amounts spent during previous conflicts. In 2007,
-spending in Afghanistan amounted to less than 1 percent of the total economy-about as much as Americans spent shopping online and less than half what they spent at Wal-Mart, while total defense spending was 4 percent of gross domestic product.‖ 42 The massive growth in the US economy over recent decades accounts for some of the disparity when spending is normalized by GDP. Additionally, as a percentage of the overall federal budget, defense spending has declined to below 50 percent compared to the Vietnam War. 43 Furthermore, unlike the Vietnam War, inflation and interest rates remained low throughout the 2000s (See Figures 1 and 2 ). Where previous administrations worried about the pressures large borrowing placed on inflation and subsequent interest rate adjustments, Bush's approach did not experience either.
So why didn't inflation or other economic factors cause the Bush Administration to ask
Americans to make an economic sacrifice reminiscent to Vietnam? There are a number of possible factors. First, labor costs were held in check as US competitors moved labor-intensive business overseas, labor unions and employees did not demand drastic wage increases, and unemployment was relatively stable. Second, the traditional competition between military goods and consumer goods during war largely faded. Although military products still compete for similar raw materials, the uniqueness of today's military hardware requires specific industrial capacity not found in the private sector. Finally, US economic expansion relative to military spending reduced the impact war traditionally places on America's industry sector.
Consequently, Americans did not ask Bush to reevaluate his financial approach. The direct and indirect economic costs of the Afghanistan War were negligible.
Personal Connection
Measuring an individual's personal connection to a war is difficult. Organizations can estimate dissatisfaction via public opinion polls and surveys, but there is no clear measure indicating the degree to which a personal connection will become active protesting. War is very personal with different meaning for different people. However, the personal connection differences between Vietnam and Afghanistan might best be described by three influencesdirect involvement, the draft and changes to the anti-war movements.
There are few clearer acts connecting a person to war than military service. Wars take on a new meaning when an individual engages in combat. The connection is also very strong for those related to or friends with military service members, especially when they serve in hostile environments. It would be challenging to quantify or rank order the strength of these connections due to a person's family tie or friendship since each relationship is unique.
However, it would follow that as more people serve, the number of direct relationships increases. What may have made Vietnam even more personal was its accessibility via television. It was the first war where media outlets were able to broadcast graphic, unedited battlefield footage to a large viewership providing even those loosely connected a front row seat. Many images were shocking and at times were in stark contrast with the reports given by the White House and Pentagon. Additionally, as the anti-war movement grew, the media covered the dissent and domestic rallies within the US. Although the views of dissidents and protesters were typically excluded from coverage, television provided the anti-war movement an audience.
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While this anti-war movement was often motivated by morale and pragmatic arguments, the draft was a major catalyst. Critics argued local draft board's discretion on who to draft or exempt were too broad and not nationally standardized. They also contended deferment rules such as the college deferment, favored those that could afford higher education. Although controversial, the draft did enlist over 648,000 military draftees or 25 percent of the total force in the Southeast Asia Theater who accounted for over 30 percent of the combat deaths.
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Yet, it is difficult to take raw service data, media changes and an anti-war movement to determine the type of connection (negative or positive), the strength, or if attitudes and opinions changed when an individual serves, dies, or is wounded. But as the number of casualties grows then personal connections are more than likely to strengthen. When the prospects of involuntary service via the draft are added, regardless if the total number is relatively small, having an even slight probability of becoming a draftee will strengthen more personal connections. For many Americans, the combination of a large number of military members serving, changes in media, a contentious draft, and civic unrest makes their connection to the Vietnam War exceptionally strong.
In contrast, the Afghanistan War involved few Americans directly. In 2001, the total number of military members serving (active, guard and reserve) was 1.55 million personnel or 1.1 percent of Americans of military age. 56 The number of military members deployed to Afghanistan was also significantly less. During the Bush years, the total number of US troops in Afghanistan never exceeded 36,000. 57 However, unlike Vietnam, America was engaged in another major conflict which competed for resources. Yet, even without the additional commitment in Iraq, it is not clear Bush and his military advisors would have pressed for a larger military footprint in Afghanistan. Additionally, the number of hostile deaths and wounded in Afghanistan were less than 650 and 2,650 respectively. 58 It was the second lowest casualty rate of any major US conflict. 59 In fact, due to advances in combat medical care the ratio of deaths to wounded improved to 1 death for every 4.4 wounded. 
Conclusion
So why have Americans not protested to the same degree as they did during Vietnam?
One could infer that because Americans have not protested to the same degree, policy makers inoculated the American public against the Vietnam Syndrome-that Americans are now willing to support protracted, bloody conflicts. Yet, this would be an incorrect conclusion. Clearly, we see a stark difference between Vietnam and Afghanistan along war rationale, economic sacrifice, and personal connection explanations (See Figure 5 ). 
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